Italo-Ethiopian War of 1887–1889

Lore & Background

The battle of Dogali became one of the most important in modern Ethiopian history. Alula did not follow up his victory, awaiting permission from Emperor Yohannes IV, who castigated him for acting without authorization. As the Mahdist uprising in Sudan spilled over the frontier, Ethiopia faced a two-front war.

Reader's Guide

The war demonstrated the military capability of Ethiopian forces under Ras Alula and the political complexities of Ethiopian internal politics, with Emperor Yohannes IV contending with rebellious vassals and a Mahdist threat. The war's legacy includes the consolidation of Italian Eritrea and the rise of Menelik II, who would later defeat Italy at Adwa.

Did You Know?

• Italian historiography originally called the fighting the Guerra d'Africa, not the Guerra d'Eritrea.

The Treaty of Wuchale and the Question of Sovereignty

The root of the First Italo-Ethiopian War lay in a single document that two nations interpreted in fundamentally opposite ways. The Treaty of Wuchale, signed between Italy and Ethiopia, became the flashpoint that transformed diplomatic tension into full-scale armed conflict. The Italian reading of the treaty was unambiguous in their eyes: it converted Ethiopia into an Italian protectorate, placing the ancient empire under Rome's political umbrella. The Ethiopian reading was equally clear to its signatories: the agreement was nothing more than a mutual pledge of peace between two sovereign powers, with no subordination implied. This irreconcilable gap in interpretation meant that neither side ever truly agreed on the terms governing their relationship. When full-scale war erupted in 1895, both armies marched to the field convinced they were defending their legitimate position. The dispute ultimately ended not with a compromise but with the Battle of Adwa, where the Ethiopian army dealt the outnumbered Italian forces and Eritrean askaris a decisive blow, forcing their retreat into Eritrea. The conflict closed with the Treaty of Addis Ababa, which effectively vindicated the Ethiopian interpretation and preserved the empire's independence until the Second Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935–36.

The Battle of Dogali: Bayonets Against Spears

On 24 January 1887, a small Italian detachment encountered Ethiopian forces at a village called Saati. The initial skirmish went in Italy's favor, but the numerical superiority of the Ethiopian warriors quickly turned the tide, surrounding the retreating Italians. In response, roughly 500 Italian soldiers under Colonel de Christoforis, accompanied by 50 Eritrean auxiliaries, were dispatched to relieve the besieged garrison. Their march proved fatal. At a location called Dogali, Ras Alula's force—armed primarily with spears—ambushed the column. The Ethiopians skillfully encircled the Italians, who fell back from one hilltop to a higher one as their position deteriorated. When Italian ammunition was exhausted, Ras Alula gave the order to charge. What followed was a brutal close-quarters engagement of bayonets against spears, and the Ethiopians swiftly overwhelmed the outnumbered column. The toll was devastating: 23 officers and 407 other ranks killed. Italian newspapers branded the engagement a "massacre" and lashed out at the Regio Esercito for failing to equip de Christoforis with sufficient ammunition. The defeat forced the Italians to abandon Saati entirely and withdraw to the Red Sea coast.

Britain's Red Sea Chess Game

The Italian presence in Eritrea was not born of pure ambition but of a calculated British decision to redirect a colonial vacancy. In the early 1870s, Isma'il Pasha of Egypt had extended control along the Red Sea coast, appointing Werner Munzinger governor of Massawa in 1871 and occupying Bogos the next year. But after a humiliating defeat in the Egyptian–Ethiopian War, Egypt's bankruptcy in 1876, and the Mahdi-led Ansar revolt of 1881, the Egyptian position in Eritrea became untenable. By 1884, Cairo was pulling out. Britain, watching from London, faced a dilemma: it could not afford the financial burden of administering Massawa itself, yet it feared that France might fill the vacuum and establish additional naval bases threatening British shipping through the Suez Canal. The Hewett Treaty of 3 June 1884, signed among Britain, Egypt, and Ethiopia, appeared to place Massawa in the Ethiopian sphere. Yet London ultimately chose to invite Italian troops to land at Massawa on 5 February 1885. British historian Augustus Wylde later called this maneuver "one of the vilest bites of treachery," accusing England of using Emperor Yohannes IV and then discarding him to Italy's mercy.

The Succession Crisis and Menelik's Ascent

The death of Emperor Yohannes IV on 10 March 1889 sent shockwaves through the Ethiopian court and reshaped the political landscape that would determine the course of the coming war. Yohannes fell after being wounded in battle against the Ansar, and on his deathbed he made a revelation that scandalized the intensely Orthodox Ethiopian establishment: he confessed that Ras Mengesha, long believed to be the son of his brother, was in fact his own child, born of his brother's wife. He asked that Mengesha succeed him. The disclosure, however, proved politically toxic. Rather than embracing the designated heir, the court turned to the Negus Menelik, who was proclaimed emperor on 26 March 1889. Ras Mengesha, one of the most powerful noblemen in the realm, was understandably bitter at being bypassed. For a period, he threw his considerable influence behind the Italians, aligning himself against the new emperor. Under the feudal Ethiopian system, such rivalries among the great lords were not unusual, but in this case the succession dispute directly complicated Italy's position in Eritrea, as the Italians found themselves entangled in Ethiopia's internal power struggles.